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Abstract
Agriculture is vulnerable to climate change and a source of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). Farmers face pressures to adjust agricultural systems to make them 
more resilient in the face of increasingly variable weather (adaptation) and 
reduce GHG production (mitigation). This research examines relationships 
between Iowa farmers’ trust in environmental or agricultural interest groups 
as sources of climate information, climate change beliefs, perceived climate 
risks to agriculture, and support for adaptation and mitigation responses. 
Results indicate that beliefs varied with trust, and beliefs in turn had a 
significant direct effect on perceived risks from climate change. Support for 
adaptation varied with perceived risks, while attitudes toward GHG reduction 
(mitigation) were associated predominantly with variation in beliefs. Most 
farmers were supportive of adaptation responses, but few endorsed GHG 
reduction, suggesting that outreach should focus on interventions that have 
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adaptive and mitigative properties (e.g., reduced tillage, improved fertilizer 
management).
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Global climate change is widely viewed as one of the most significant chal-
lenges facing society today. Agriculture is vulnerable to climate shifts and a 
significant source of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) that are driving those 
changes (Beddington et al., 2012; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC], 2007; National Research Council [NRC], 2010a). Long-
term shifts in annual averages and seasonal patterns of precipitation, tem-
perature, and humidity, as well as more erratic and extreme weather events 
leading to increased risk of floods, drought, and fire are anticipated for the 
future (Coumou & Rahmstorf, 2012; Hatfield et al., 2011). Predicted impacts 
on agriculture include redistribution of water availability and compromised 
quality, increased soil erosion, and decreased crop productivity (Howden 
et al., 2007; McCarl, 2010), which present immediate and localized eco-
nomic risks to farmers. In contrast, production of GHGs has effects across 
the larger landscape that are not readily apparent at short time scales. It is 
estimated that agriculture contributes between 10% and 15% of global 
anthropogenic GHG emissions including nitrous oxide (N2O), methane 
(CH4), and carbon dioxide (CO2); (Climate Change Position Statement 
Working Group, 2011; IPCC, 2007). Thus, climate-change-related threats to 
agriculture represent threats to quality of life at local and global scales, and 
calls for the development of adaptation and mitigation strategies for agricul-
ture are increasing in their urgency (e.g., Coumou & Rahmstorf, 2012; 
Howden et al., 2007; McCarl, 2010).
Literature on adaptation and mitigation of natural hazards finds that 
behavioral responses to hazards depend in large part on risk perception, or 
“beliefs about the existence and characteristics of a natural hazard” (Nigg & 
Mileti, 2002, p. 280). In other words, behavior change is influenced by per-
ceptions of the risks associated with a given natural hazard, which are medi-
ated by beliefs about (1) the existence of the hazard and (2) its characteristics. 
Perceived risk among individuals or collectivities, while a critical determi-
nant of willingness to prepare for or mitigate natural hazards, is often at odds 
with objective assessments of risk (Nigg & Mileti, 2002). Because percep-
tions of risk are socially constructed and transmitted, differences in 
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worldviews, personal experiences, expectations about technology, trust in 
institutions, and other factors can influence awareness and understanding of 
hazards and decisions and actions (or inaction) in response (Slovic, 2009).
Beliefs and risk perceptions regarding climate change are particularly 
unsettled. Whereas scientific understanding of climate change is firmly 
established—it is occurring, it is due primarily to human activities, and it 
poses potentially serious risks to human society and natural systems (NRC, 
2010b)—public understanding of the phenomenon varies widely (Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2009; Weber, 2010). In recent reviews of 
research on public understanding of climate change, Weber and Stern (2011) 
and others (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011; Leiserowitz, 2006; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2011b) highlight a number of factors that explain vari-
ance in U.S. public perspectives on the issue. Climate change is difficult for a 
general public to understand because the causes (GHGs) are invisible and sig-
nals and impacts are diffuse and difficult to predict or interpret correctly, espe-
cially at local levels and human time scales (Gleick, 2012; Weber & Stern, 
2011). In addition, whereas climate science is based on analytical processing 
of large amounts of carefully collected data, individuals tend to base judg-
ments and decisions on associative and affective models of cognition that are 
evolutionarily older and rooted more in feeling than in scientific facts (Marx 
& Weber, 2012; Slovic, 2009; Weber & Stern, 2011). Furthermore, formation 
of attitudes toward relatively new, emerging attitude objects such as climate 
change may be more strongly influenced by values and worldviews than by 
objective data (Weber & Stern, 2011). Finally, because climate change is dif-
ficult to understand based on personal experience, the public must rely on 
indirect sources of information on climate change, which can be manipulated 
by actors with disparate interests (Kahan et al., 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 
2010; Weber & Stern, 2011). Moreover, these factors have led to a
public confronted with complex physical phenomena that cannot be understood 
without mediated knowledge, subject to normal cognitive and affective limitations, 
and surrounded by a politicized struggle to shape understanding that is amplified 
by polarized media that offer knowledge claims congenial to selected audiences’ 
goals, values, and worldviews. (Weber & Stern, 2011, p. 322)
The resulting uncertainty and variance in understandings have eroded public 
support for climate policy and retarded action.
While the U.S. general public’s understanding of climate change has been 
studied in some depth, little research has examined farmer perceptions about 
climate change and accompanying risk (Barnes & Toma, 2012). Farmers are 
the group on which the tasks of climate change adaptation and mitigation in 
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agriculture will mainly fall (Berry, Rounsevell, Harrison, & Audsley, 2006). 
However, farmer attitudes toward the actions that might be required to adapt 
agriculture to changes in climate as well as decrease agriculture’s GHG emis-
sions are largely unknown. As Howden et al. (2007) emphasize, if farmers do 
not believe that climate change is happening or do not perceive it as a threat, 
they will not likely undertake adaptive or mitigative actions. Given the evi-
dence that belief in and perceived risks from hazards are necessary (but not 
sufficient) conditions for action, and the predicted threats that climate change 
poses to sustainable production of food and energy, an improved understand-
ing of farmer beliefs and risk perceptions associated with climate change is 
urgently needed. In particular, it is critically important to understand what 
factors shape attitudes toward responses to climate change (Dunlap, 2010).
This study examines the complex relationships between farmer beliefs 
about climate change, risk perceptions, trust in key institutions, and attitudes 
toward adaptive and mitigative actions. It does so through analysis of data 
from a state-wide survey of Iowa farmers to answer the following research 
questions: (1) Do farmers believe that climate change is occurring, and if so, 
to what do they attribute it?; (2) Does differential trust in agricultural and 
environmental interest groups influence those beliefs?; (3) Do variations in 
farmer understanding of climate change influence levels of perceived risk?; 
(4) Do levels of perceived risk predict support for adaptive and mitigative 
action?; and, (5) Do predictors of support for adaptive action differ from 
predictors of support for mitigation? We use structural equation modeling 
(SEM) to assess the relationships between trust, belief, perceived risk, and 
support for action.
Beliefs, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Responses to 
Climate Change
Because there is a paucity of literature on farmers’ understandings of and 
response to climate change, we draw on the burgeoning body of research that 
examines the general public’s beliefs, attitudes, policy preferences, and 
behaviors associated with climate change to inform our analysis. Much of 
this research has built on the “values–beliefs–norms” (VBN) framework for 
analyzing relationships between environmental concerns and behavior (e.g., 
Brody, Grover, & Vedlitz, 2012; Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007). The VBN 
framework was developed primarily by Stern and colleagues (Dietz, 
Fitzgerald, & Shwom, 2005; Stern, 2000) to help frame the investigation of 
relationships between pro-environmental behaviors and key explanatory 
variables such as personal values, beliefs, attitudes, and norms. The model 
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proposes a causal chain of several categories of variables that together explain 
a substantial amount of variance in environmentally significant behavior. 
Loosely described, the categories are personal values; beliefs, including envi-
ronmental worldviews; understandings of the causes and consequences of 
environmental problems; personal capacity to address those problems; and 
personal norms or sense of moral obligation to take action (Stern, 2000, 
p. 412).
The VBN’s environmentally oriented synthesis of a number of other 
behavioral models (e.g., the theory of planned behavior [Ajzen, 1991]) has 
proved useful in conceptualizing and analyzing the determinants of pro-envi-
ronmental behavior (Dietz et al., 2005). We look to the VBN literature, par-
ticularly that which has focused on public response to climate change, as a 
reference and guide to the development of a conceptual framework specific 
to our research questions about the relationships between trust in agents of 
influence, beliefs about climate change, perceived risk, and support for adap-
tive and mitigative responses in agriculture.
Beliefs About Climate Change and Support for 
Action
Individuals’ beliefs about the world and their place in it are central to most 
major behavioral models. The expectancy-value (EV) model (Fishbein, 
1963), the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985), and the VBN theory 
(Stern, 2000), all posit that beliefs provide the foundation from which atti-
tudes toward objects and actions are formed, and those attitudes can be highly 
predictive of behaviors. It is critical to recognize, however, that beliefs may 
not be scientifically based and may vary substantially between individuals 
and groups. Indeed, “they may be irrational, based on invalid or selective 
information, be self-serving, or otherwise fail to correspond to reality,” but 
nevertheless “form the cognitive foundation for many of our responses to 
aspects of that world” (Ajzen & Gilbert Cote, 2008, p. 290). This observation 
is particularly salient in relation to beliefs about climate change given the 
variance in U.S. public understanding of the phenomenon (Maibach et al., 
2009; Weber & Stern, 2011).
Studies examining the relationships between beliefs about climate change 
and behavior or policy support have used varied and generally indirect mea-
sures of belief. Dietz et al. (2007) used two measures of “climate change 
information” consisting of (1) number of times respondents had obtained 
information specifically about climate change from various sources including 
newspapers, magazines, television, and the like and (2) a scale measure of 
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how “well informed” about climate change respondents considered them-
selves to be. O’Connor, Bord, and Fisher (1999) and O’Connor, Bord, Yarnal, 
and Wiefek (2002) measured belief in climate change through a single-scale 
item rating the likelihood that average global temperatures would rise over 
the following 50 years, and measured understanding of causes through an 
index of several 3-point scales assessing the perceived role of several poten-
tial causes of climate change (e.g., heating and cooling homes). Zahran, 
Brody, Grover, and Vedlitz (2006, p. 779) used two climate change “knowl-
edge” variables. The first was measured through true/false responses to two 
statements: “Nitrous oxide is a greenhouse gas” and, “The major cause of 
increased atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases is burning of fossil 
fuels.” Brody et al. (2012) used an index measure constructed from five true/
false statements about climate change and its causes, including items regard-
ing scientific certainty about sea-level rise and increases in global precipita-
tion, whether fossil fuels increase atmospheric concentration of GHGs, and 
whether N2O is a GHG.
Findings on the relationships between these varied dimensions of belief 
and support for action have been mixed. Dietz et al. (2007) found no relation-
ship between exposure to sources of information or self-rated knowledge 
about climate change and support for climate change policy. O’Connor et al. 
(1999) found belief that global average temperature would rise over the next 
50 years and knowledge of the causes of “global warming” to be positive 
predictors of policy support. On the other hand, O’Connor et al. (2002) found 
no associations between belief in temperature rise and policy support or 
expressed likelihood of engaging in voluntary GHG-reducing behaviors, but 
did find positive relationships between understanding of causes and both of 
those variables. Zahran et al. (2006) found a correlation between climate 
change policy support and knowledge about GHGs. Brody et al. (2012), on 
the other hand, detected no relationship between their larger set of climate 
knowledge/causes scale and willingness to adopt climate change mitigation 
behavior. Such studies have provided valuable insight into the role that differ-
ent dimensions of climate change beliefs may play in shaping responses to 
climate change. However, variability in the measures used has made syn-
thetic interpretation of results difficult.
Given that erroneous public understanding of climate change has been 
proposed as an important roadblock to public action (Weber & Stern, 2011), 
it may be that inconsistencies in the measurement of public understanding of 
climate change is a barrier to better understanding of the relationships 
between beliefs and behavior/policy support. While use of straightforward 
measures of beliefs about climate change and its causes are common in pub-
lic polling on the issue (e.g., Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2011) 
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or used as dependent variables (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), they are 
rarely used as predictors of policy support or behavior. Thus, most attempts 
to improve our understanding of the links between beliefs about climate 
change and behavioral and policy responses have used indirect rather than 
direct measures of belief and attribution. In other words, measures such as 
knowledge that N2O is a GHG may not be robust proxies for overall beliefs 
about whether climate change is occurring and what its causes are. As noted 
above, direct measures of belief and attribution have been used in surveys: It 
is known that some people strongly believe that climate change is occurring 
and attribute it to human activity, others do not believe that it is happening, 
and still others are uncertain (e.g., Maibach et al., 2009). Such direct mea-
sures of climate change belief are not, however, commonly employed as pre-
dictors in multivariate modeling of behavior, support for policy, or other 
social action.
Perceived Risk
Perceived risk has been a central focus of research on response to climate 
change. Risk perception corresponds to beliefs about “adverse consequences 
for valued objects” (AC) and is central to the VBN framework (Stern, 2000, 
p. 412). Risk perception has generally been measured as an individual’s 
assessment of the potential health, economic, and general environmental con-
sequences of climate change at local, regional, and global levels (Brody et al., 
2012; Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008; Dietz et al., 2007; Leiserowitz, 
2006; O’Connor et al., 1999, 2002; Zahran et al., 2006). Results of empirical 
research examining the relationships between perceived risk and public 
responses to climate change have been consistent in terms of significance and 
predictive power. Whether the dependent variable is mitigation policy prefer-
ences (Dietz et al., 2007; Leiserowitz, 2006; Zahran et al., 2006) or mitigative 
behavioral intentions (O’Connor et al., 1999, 2002), perceived risk has con-
sistently been found to be among the strongest positive predictors of support 
for climate change policy and behavior. The few studies that have included 
measures of “objective” risk (e.g., Brody et al., 2008, 2012; Zahran et al., 
2006) have reported that perceptions regarding the severity of risk associated 
with climate change outweigh objective risk factors such as proximity to the 
coast as determinants of climate policy support.
Although findings have been consistent, it is important to take into account 
that perceptions of risk from climate change may vary with understanding 
and knowledge of the phenomenon. Perceived risk is an affect heuristic, 
based on experiential learning and emotional response to external stimulus 
(Slovic, 2009; Weber & Stern, 2011), and influenced by factors that may 
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cause over- or under-estimation of risk. The tendency toward associative and 
affective processes and reliance on mediated information creates vulnerabil-
ity to competing climate change frames put forth by interest groups (Weber 
& Stern, 2011), and suggests that the potential influence of such groups 
should be examined.
Trust in Institutional Actors
In an increasingly globalizing and specializing society, we are ever more 
dependent on what Giddens (1990) termed abstract or expert systems. This is 
especially true for potentially globalized phenomena such as nuclear war or 
ecological catastrophe that people cannot “opt out of” (Giddens, 1990, p. 84). 
Such large-scale phenomena necessarily place the responsibility for manage-
ment of associated risks on large, complex institutional contexts (Freudenburg, 
1993). As society has become progressively more reliant on expert systems to 
manage risk, trust in the capacity of those systems and their component agen-
cies and organizations to fulfill their mandate has come to have a significant 
influence on perceptions of large-scale risk (Freudenburg, 1993; Kahan et al., 
2011). While “the central tendency is to see most such technological systems 
as having worked properly, the vast majority of the time” (Alario & 
Freudenburg, 2003, p. 199), periodic failures that cause harm can also lead to 
questioning of the ability “of institutional actors to carry out their responsibili-
ties with the degree of vigor necessary to merit the societal trust they enjoy” 
(Alario & Freudenburg, 2003, p. 200). Thus, perceptions of the seriousness of 
risks depend in large part on the degree to which we trust actors in expert sys-
tems to manage them appropriately (Freudenburg, 1993; Kahan et al., 2011).
As Dietz et al. (2007) noted, people who make decisions under conditions 
of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge tend to look to trusted institutions for 
guidance, and level of trust correlates with public acceptance of policy 
response. However, social actors who profit from the status quo can seek to 
influence discourse and the shaping of knowledge (Dietz, Frey, & Rosa, 
2002). The issue of climate change, in particular, has been highly contested, 
especially in the United States, with varied actors seeking to frame the issue 
and potential responses in ways that favor their interests (Weber & Stern, 
2011). While institutions such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA), the IPCC, and the U.S. National Climate Assessment (NCA) have 
worked to inform society about the risks of and potential responses to climate 
change, some interest groups have mounted substantial counter-efforts to 
“manufacture uncertainty” regarding the phenomenon and shape discourse 
about how society should or should not respond (Dunlap & McCright, 2010). 
Predominant strategies include “denial of global warming, the denial of its 
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anthropogenic sources and the denial of its seriousness” (Dunlap & McCright, 
2010, p. 240). Such mediation of information by interest groups has muddled 
public understanding of climate change and retarded public action (Weber & 
Stern, 2011).
The recognition that public understanding of climate change is mediated 
by intermediary sources has led to the use of variables measuring trust in such 
entities as predictors of policy support. Zahran et al. (2006) found that confi-
dence in the competence of the EPA, the National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the IPCC to “solve the problem of 
climate change” predicted support for climate change policy. Dietz et al. 
(2007) found that generalized trust in government agencies and scientists 
working for the government was a positive predictor of climate policy sup-
port, while trust in industry (oil companies, coal companies, and scientists 
working for industry) was negatively associated. O’Connor et al. (1999) 
found the degree to which survey respondents believed that government is a 
“helpful” institution predicted higher levels of willingness to endorse climate 
change mitigation policy. Thus, research suggests that trust in entities that are 
working to address climate change is associated with support for climate 
change policy, while trust in actors that have historically opposed action on 
climate change (i.e., industry) is associated with negative attitudes toward 
such action.
Adaptation and Mitigation in Agriculture
Climate change adaptation and mitigation in agriculture are related concepts, 
but have important biophysical, economic, and conceptual differences that 
may affect farmer attitudes toward action. Adaptation is defined as “initia-
tives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems 
against actual or expected climate change effects” (IPCC, 2007, p. 809). 
Adaptation has always been central to farming, and over millennia farmers 
have generally been adept at adapting agriculture to a changing environment 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2012). 
Although farmers manage at multiple scales, their adaptation decisions are 
primarily driven by private benefits reaped in the here and now (Jackson et al., 
2010). Examples of adaptation of agriculture to the impacts of climate change 
might include adjustments in planting dates, crop varieties, drainage systems, 
and land management regimes to maintain yields and soil fertility. In the U.S. 
Midwest, commonly recommended adaptive actions include increased use of 
practices such as minimization of tillage and use of cover crops to protect 
soils from erosion and build soil organic matter (Lal et al., 2011). Such prac-
tices have relatively observable, immediate impacts, such as reduced 
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vulnerability, that accrue largely to the individual farmer or landowner who 
adopts them (Walthal et al., 2012). Thus, adaptation strategies are familiar 
and have tangible individual-level benefits.
Whereas adaptation has long been integral to agriculture, climate change 
mitigation is a relatively new attitude object. Mitigation is defined as “tech-
nological change and substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions 
per unit of output” (IPCC, 2007, p. 818). In agriculture, mitigation is focused 
primarily on reducing GHG emissions and/or increasing carbon sequestra-
tion and storage (IPCC, 2007). In contrast to adaptation action, the potential 
benefits of mitigation action are uncertain, entail substantial lag time, and 
accrue globally rather than locally (Walthal et al., 2012). Because the bene-
fits of mitigative action are diffuse, much of the public discussion related to 
GHG production and mitigation to reduce emissions has focused on collec-
tive responses by civil society, private sectors, and, especially, government 
bodies (World Bank, 2012). In agriculture, too, major proposed strategies to 
induce GHG reduction have focused on collective, government-led responses 
including legislative mandates to reduce emissions, emissions taxes, and cap 
and trade regimes (Council for Agricultural Science and Technology 
[CAST], 2011).
Hence, while adaptation and mitigation policy and action are responses to 
threats from climate change, they are fundamentally different. Whereas adap-
tation is generally initiated at the local level by individuals or communities in 
reaction to specific threats, mitigation action tends to be initiated at the inter-
national or national levels and managed by government bodies (Klein et al., 
2007). Furthermore, the rationale for mitigation in agriculture is almost 
entirely predicated on the assumption that human production of GHGs is the 
primary driver of climate change. Thus, while adaptation in agriculture is 
relatively routine—farmers continuously adapt to changing conditions 
regardless of beliefs about climate change—attitudes toward and willingness 
to support mitigative action are likely influenced largely by beliefs about 
climate change and the role of human activities as a cause.
Hypotheses
The literature reviewed above indicates that beliefs about climate change and 
perceptions of associated risks can be important predictors of public support 
for climate change action. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the mediating 
influence of actors that attempt to shape the framing and debate over climate 
change and societal responses should be accounted for in analyses of public 
understanding of climate change. Based on this previous research, for this 
study of Iowa farmers, we propose two models that posit pathways of 
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effect-prioritized relationships between trust in agricultural and environmental 
interest groups as sources of climate change information, beliefs about climate 
change and its causes, the perceived risks of climate change for agriculture, 
and support for (1) adaptive or (2) mitigative responses to climate change 
among Iowa farmers.
Our specific hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Trust in agricultural interest groups will be nega-
tively associated with belief in human-induced climate change;
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Trust in environmentally oriented interest groups 
will be positively associated with belief in human-induced climate change;
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Belief that climate change is occurring will be posi-
tively associated with perceptions regarding risks to agriculture;
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Higher levels of perceived risk will predict stronger 
support for adaptation responses to climate change;
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Belief that climate change is occurring and caused by 
human activity will have a direct, positive effect on support for mitigation 
policy.
Method
Study Context and Data Collection
The study focuses on farmers in the state of Iowa, the top U.S. producer of 
corn and soybean (U.S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural 
Statistics Service [USDA NASS], 2012). Climate change-related shifts in 
long-term weather patterns predicted for the state include warmer winters, 
longer growing seasons, higher dew point temperatures, higher annual stream 
flow, and more frequent extreme weather events (Iowa Climate Change 
Impacts Committee [ICCIC], 2011). While changes such as a longer growing 
season may be favorable to Iowa agriculture, others could lead to negative 
impacts such as increased soil erosion, delays in planting or crop damage, 
higher incidence of pests and disease, and heat-induced pollination problems 
(Hatfield et al., 2011; Rogovska & Cruse, 2011). Iowa has experienced many 
of these in recent years (ICCIC, 2011), and thus represents a suitable context 
for research on farmer attitudes toward adaptation to such impacts.
Agriculture also emits a disproportionately high percentage of Iowa’s 
overall GHGs relative to other states. Whereas agriculture directly generates 
about 7% of US GHGs through activities such as enteric fermentation in 
ruminant livestock, manure management, and use of nitrogen fertilizers 
(USEPA, 2013, p. 6-1), in 2011, direct emissions of GHGs from agriculture 
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comprised 26% of Iowa’s overall GHG emissions (Iowa Department of 
Natural Resources [IDNR], 2012, p. 3). Fifty-nine percent of agricultural 
GHGs stemmed from soil management for grain production and the balance 
from livestock production and waste (IDNR, 2012, p. 5). These activities 
primarily generate the potent GHGs CH4 and N2O, which have “global warm-
ing potentials” 21 and 310 times that of CO2, respectively (Forster et al., 
2007, p. 212). Thus, Iowa also provides an appropriate context for examining 
farmer attitudes toward mitigation action.
The data for this research were collected through the 2011 Iowa Farm and 
Rural Life Poll (IFRLP), an annual statewide survey of Iowa farmers con-
ducted by Iowa State University Sociology Extension. Iowa Agricultural 
Statistics administers the survey following a survey–postcard–survey mail-
ing protocol. The 2011 survey was mailed to 2,030 farmers in February 
2011. Useable surveys were received from 1,276 farmers, for a response rate 
of 63%.
A note regarding the sample is warranted. The original survey panel was a 
random sample drawn from the Census of Agriculture master list, and the 
survey panel is periodically refreshed with random samples from this list to 
address attrition due to retirement and other factors. Because the IFRLP 
focuses so heavily on agricultural activities, many smaller-scale “farmers” 
who are sampled because they could potentially produce US$1,000 in sales 
(the USDA definition of farm), but do not actually farm, choose not to partici-
pate because the surveys do not apply to them. A comparison of 2011 IFRLP 
and 2007 Census of Agriculture statistics shows that this process has led to an 
IFRLP sample bias toward larger scale farmers. IFRLP farmers operated an 
average of 402 ac in 2011, compared with 331 ac among the 2007 census 
population. A comparison of farm sales finds that 15.2% of IFRLP farmers 
had 2011 gross farm sales of less than $10,000, compared with 38.6% of the 
2007 Census population. At the other end of the sales spectrum, 48.2% of 
IFRLP farmers had 2011 sales greater than $100,000, compared with 35.6% 
for the 2007 census population (USDA NASS, 2009). While this bias toward 
larger scale farmers might be seen as a liability for some research efforts, for 
this study it is considered an asset because larger scale farms operate a dis-
proportionate amount of acreage. For example, whereas only 39% of Iowa 
farms generate $100,000 or more in gross sales, they operate 83% of farm-
land acreage (USDA NASS, 2009). Thus, our findings regarding attitudes 
toward adaptation and mitigation activities are biased toward farmers who 
generate a larger proportion of Iowa’s agricultural production and farm oper-
ations that are reflective of mainstream, conventional agricultural systems in 
the Upper Midwest.
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Variables in the Model
Trust in institutional actors as sources of climate change information was 
measured through a five-point construct-specific scale ranging from strongly 
distrust (1) to strongly trust (5) applied to a number of agencies, organiza-
tions, and other groups. The list was based on several public opinion polls, 
especially Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf (2009), with the addition 
of a number of agriculture-specific actors. Survey research examining the 
relationship between trust and climate change response has generally focused 
on entities that promote societal responses to climate change (e.g., the EPA or 
IPCC in Zahran et al., 2006). To our knowledge, only Dietz et al. (2007) 
included groups that could be expected to have positive and negative influ-
ences on beliefs regarding climate change. Like Dietz et al. (2007), we 
include groups that in general are not supportive of societal action on climate 
change. Our variables focused on trust specific to climate information rather 
than on generalized trust in agencies, organizations, or corporate interest 
groups (Table 1).
Following McCright and Dunlap’s (2010) analysis of interest groups that 
attempt to shape discourse and knowledge about climate change, its causes, 
and potential impacts, and in line with hypotheses H1a and H1b, we catego-
rize a diverse range of groups as environmentally oriented interests and sev-
eral groups as agricultural interests. Six entities and actors in the 
environmental interest category were included in the survey: “federal agen-
cies,” “state agencies,” “conservation organizations,” “environmental organi-
zations,” “scientists,” and “the mainstream news media.” All of these 
categories of actors have been associated with beliefs that climate change is 
occurring, that it is caused at least in part by human activity, and that society 
needs to adapt and/or mitigate in response (see Dietz et al., 2002; Freudenburg 
& Muselli, 2010; McCright & Dunlap, 2010).
Mainstream agricultural interest groups have long opposed climate change 
policy. Farm groups, principal among them the influential American Farm 
Bureau Federation, have consistently voiced opposition to climate legislation 
(American Farm Bureau Federation, 2012; Dunlap, 2010; Iowa Corn Growers 
Association, 2011; Union of Concerned Scientists, 2010; Winter, 2010). We 
include three general categories of agriculture-related entities that represent 
agricultural interests: “farm groups,” the “farm press,” and “agribusiness 
companies” (Table 1).
Beliefs about climate change and its causes are measured through ordered 
responses to a single question that combines belief and attribution. Beliefs 
regarding climate change and its causes are often measured through a two-
stage question set that first ascertains beliefs about whether the phenomenon 
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is occurring, and second establishes beliefs about attribution (e.g., Leiserowitz 
et al., 2009, 2011). We combine belief about the existence of climate change 
and its causes into a single ordinal question to allow modeling of variance 
associated with conceptually ordered combinations of belief and attribution 
and testing of the hypothesis that perceived risks associated with climate 
change and support for societal response will vary according to those ordered 
combinations (Table 2).
Perceived risks associated with climate change are measured through four 
items that were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 5 (strongly agree). Three items elicited responses about potential 
impacts of climate change on agriculture. One item was developed from the 
New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) literature (see Dunlap, 2008), specifi-
cally drawing on the “human exemptionalist” thread of that literature high-
lighting a widely held belief that “ . . . humans—unlike other species—are 
exempt from the constraints of nature” (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 
2000, p. 432). The item measures the degree to which farmers believe that 
human ingenuity will reduce threats from climate change by facilitating 
adaptation to changes (Table 3).
Support for adaptive and mitigative responses to climate change was mea-
sured through three items, measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
Table 2. Observed Frequencies for Climate Change Belief.
Variable Categorya Proportion (%)
NOCC (1) Climate change is not occurring. 4.6
UNCERT (2) There is not sufficient evidence to know 
with certainty whether climate change is 
occurring.
27.0
NAT (3) Climate change is occurring and it is 
caused mostly by natural changes in the 
environment.
23.0
HUMNAT (4) Climate change is occurring, and it is 
caused equally by natural changes in the 
environment and human activities.b
35.0
HUM (5) Climate change is occurring, and it is caused 
mostly by human activities.
10.4
aThe survey items were preceded by the text, “There is increasing discussion about climate 
change and its potential impacts. Please select the statement that best reflects your beliefs 
about climate change.”
bResponse Category 4, which allowed respondents to attribute climate change to both human 
and natural causes, was included because polling has consistently found that survey respondents 
volunteer this response (e.g., Leiserowitz et al., 2009, 2011).
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disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), gauging the degree to which participants sup-
port specific adaptation and mitigation actions. Two items focused on adapta-
tion responses specific to a major predicted impact of climate change on Iowa 
agriculture: increased incidence of precipitation (ICCIC, 2011). The first item, 
“Iowa farmers should take additional steps to protect their land from increased 
precipitation,” focuses on protection of agricultural land from increases in rain-
fall. Extreme rain events in 2008 and 2010 resulted in significant, widespread 
erosion across Iowa (Cox, Hug, & Bruzelius, 2011), raising awareness of the 
issue and a potential need to act. The second adaptation statement, “Iowa farm-
ers should increase investment in agricultural drainage systems (tile, ditches) to 
prepare for increased precipitation,” is particularly salient for Iowa farmers 
given the hydrological history and current profile of Iowa’s most productive 
agricultural lands. Artificial drainage of Iowa’s humid prairie, the soils of 
which contain extraordinary amounts of organic matter (Mutel, 2007), facili-
tated cultivation of these highly fertile soils and made Iowa a leading agricul-
tural state (Peterson & Englehorn, 1946; Soil Conservation Service [SCS], 
1983). Drainage represents a longstanding engineered solution to the problem 
of “excess” water in Iowa, and a logical adaptive strategy for maintaining pro-
ductivity in the face of future increases in precipitation.
The mitigation item, “Government should do more to reduce the nation’s 
greenhouse gas emissions and other potential causes of climate change,” is a 
general statement that measures farmer support for public action to address 
the anthropogenic causes of climate change. It reflects the fact that mitigation 
is generally initiated by government bodies (Klein et al., 2007) and that major 
proposals for mitigation action in agriculture are government-led (CAST, 
2011). Support for mitigation implies an acceptance that human activity is a 
driver of climate change and collective action is necessary to incentivize, 
regulate, or otherwise induce changes in behavior.
Analytical Approach
We use structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the study’s hypotheses. 
Structural equation models are a versatile class of models for characterizing 
multivariate relationships. The general SEM combines factor analysis and 
regression models to allow structural relationships among latent variables 
(Bollen, 1989). We construct two multivariate models that draw on SEM 
techniques. Specifically, these models contain relationships among latent 
variables that represent trust in agricultural and environmental interests, 
belief in and attribution of climate change, perceived climate risks, and sup-
port for action. Model 1 investigates support for adaptive action, and 
Model 2 investigates support for mitigative action.
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The variables used in the analysis all consist of ordered response categories. 
Since traditional SEM methodology incorporates covariance structures assuming 
continuous responses, we modify the SEM approach to appropriately account for 
the discrete but ordered nature of the data (Kim, Das, Chen, & Warren, 2009). 
Briefly, the approach links the observed responses to unobserved continuous 
variables through an ordinal probit model, and these continuous variables then 
form a SEM. This allows for efficient estimation, which we accomplish through 
Bayesian analysis. Further model and estimation details can be found in the 
online appendix (at http://eab.sagepub.com/supplemental).
Two models are developed to test the hypothesized relationships between 
trust, beliefs, perceived risks, and support for climate change adaptation and 
mitigation responses. Both models examine hypotheses H1a and H1b through 
a structural regression of beliefs about climate change on trust in agricultural 
and environmental interests as sources of information about climate change. 
In addition each model includes a structural path from beliefs about climate 
change to perceived risks to test H2. The response variable for Model 1 is 
support for adaptation (H3). The dependent variable for Model 2 is support 
for mitigative action (H4).
Results
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Model
Responses for the nine items that comprise the two trust variables—trust in 
agricultural and environmentally oriented entities, respectively, as sources of 
information about climate change—varied substantially. Among the agricul-
tural interests, the percentage of farmers who indicated at least some trust 
ranged from 40% for “farm groups” to 24% for “agribusiness companies” 
(Table 1). Among environmentally oriented groups, “scientists” were the most 
trusted (42%) and the mainstream news media were the least trusted (9%).
Results for the climate change belief and attribution variable revealed that 
most farmers (68%) believed that climate change is occurring (Table 2). 
Attribution of cause varies substantially, with just 10% believing climate 
change is mostly attributable to human activities. Slightly more than one 
third believed that it is caused by natural changes and human activities 
equally, and 23% believed it is mostly due to natural variation. Furthermore, 
a sizable proportion of farmers believed there is not enough evidence to 
determine if it is occurring (27%) or it is not happening at all (5%).
Summary statistics for the four items that measure perceived risks associ-
ated with climate change are presented in Table 3. The items that elicited the 
highest levels of agreement were concern about impact on the respondents’ 
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own operations (46% agreement) and on Iowa agriculture in general (43%). 
Thirty-five percent of farmers indicated belief that extreme weather would become 
more common in the future. On the other hand, 33% agreed that climate change is 
not a big issue because human ingenuity will enable us to adapt to changes.
Results showed substantial levels of support for both adaptation-related 
items. About two thirds of respondents agreed that farmers should take steps 
to protect their land, and 45% agreed that investment in agricultural drainage 
systems should be stepped up (Table 3). Support for government actions to 
mitigate climate change through GHG reduction was lower, with 33% of 
farmers in agreement with that statement.
Structural Relationships: Trust, Belief, and Perceived Risk
The structural coefficients for Models 1 and 2 are presented on their respec-
tive paths in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. The Tucker–Lewis goodness-of-fit 
index (TLI) measures the incremental improvement in a model’s fit to the 
observed covariance structure over a null model and typically ranges from 0 
to 1 (Tucker & Lewis, 1973). For the Bayesian analysis, the posterior mean 
TLI can be computed from samples of the posterior distribution. The TLI for 
Model 1 is 0.784, and the TLI for Model 2 is 0.783, suggesting adequate fits. 
The models show key similarities in the relationships among trust, climate 
change belief, and perceived risk. The correlation between the two trust 
0.458***
(0.401, 0.512) 
Trust in
Agricultural Interests 
Trust in
Environmental
Interests 
Climate Change
Belief/Attribution 
AG1 
AG2 
AG3
ENV1
ENV2
ENV3 ENV4
ENV5
ENV6
-0.248***
(-0.319, -0.177)
0.754***
(0.696, 0.810) Perceived
Climate Risks 
RISK1
RISK2 RISK3
RISK4
0.887***
(0.843, 0.928) 
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Adaptation 
PROTECT 
1.246***
(0.993, 1.576) 
-0.476***
(-0.821, -0.208) 
DRAIN 
1 – Not Occurring 
2 - Uncertain 
3 – Mostly Natural 
4 – Both Human/Natural 
5 – Mostly Human 
Figure 1. Model 1: Adaptation path diagram and standardized structural 
coefficients with 95% credible intervals in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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constructs (0.46) is measured to control for generalized trust, or the degree to 
which individuals tend to trust others (Hammar & Jagers, 2006).
Regression coefficients for climate change belief and attribution were sig-
nificant. Trust in environmentally oriented interests is positively associated 
with belief, meaning that respondents who expressed trust in these groups as 
sources of information about climate change were more likely to believe that 
climate change is occurring and attributable to human sources. An opposite 
but somewhat weaker relationship was found between trust in agricultural 
interests and climate change belief. Respondents who expressed higher levels 
of trust in agricultural interests were relatively more likely to be uncertain or 
not believe that climate change is occurring. These structural coefficients 
support H1a and H1b.
Furthermore, these mediated understandings of climate change had a 
direct effect on perceived risk. The significant and positive path coefficient 
between belief and perceived risk in both models indicates that farmers who 
believe climate change is occurring and associated with human activity 
expressed substantially higher levels of concern. These structural relation-
ships between belief and perceived climate risk support H2.
Belief, Perceived Risk, and Adaptation
In turn, beliefs about climate change and perceived risks were related to 
farmer support for adaptive actions. Model 1 incorporates support for 
0.455***
(0.399, 0.508) 
AG3 
Trust in
Agricultural Interests 
Trust in
Environmental
Interests 
Climate Change
Belief/Attribution 
1 – Not Occurring 
2 - Uncertain 
3 – Mostly Natural 
4 – Both Human/Natural 
5 – Mostly Human 
AG1 
AG2 
ENV1
ENV2
ENV3 ENV4
ENV5
ENV6
-0.289***
(-0.351, -0.227)
0.843***
(0.792, 0.893) Perceived
Climate Risk 
RISK1
RISK2 RISK3
RISK4
0.869***
(0.830, 0.904) 
Support for
Mitigation 
MITIGATE 
-0.130
(-0.339, 0.051)
0.969***
(0.795, 1.167) 
Figure 2. Model 2: Mitigation path diagram and standardized structural 
coefficients with 95% credible intervals in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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adaptive action as a response variable, and models both direct and indirect 
effects of beliefs on support for adaptive action (Figure 1). The coefficient for 
the path from perceived risk to support for adaptive action is positive and 
significant, indicating that individuals with higher than average levels of per-
ceived risk tend to have higher levels of support for adaptation. Although 
smaller in magnitude, the coefficient measuring the direct effect of belief on 
support for adaptation is negative and significant. However, the paths from 
belief to perceived risk and from risk to adaptation are significant and posi-
tive. The total effect is positive, indicating a strong indirect effect on support 
for adaptation through perceived risk. In other words, farmers who had higher 
scores on the ordinal climate change belief scale and perceived higher risks 
of negative impacts were more likely to endorse adaptive action. Overall, the 
model indicates that endorsement of adaptive action was associated primarily 
with higher levels of perceived risks. This result supports H3.
Belief, Perceived Risk, and Mitigation
Model 2’s response variable is support for government action to reduce GHG 
emissions (Figure 2). The coefficient measuring the relationship between cli-
mate change belief and support for mitigation is positive and significant. This 
suggests that belief in climate change and attribution to human activities is 
associated with stronger support for government mitigation policy. On the 
other hand, the coefficient measuring the indirect effect through perceived 
risk is not significant.
The positive, direct effect of belief on support for mitigation indicates that 
farmers who believe that climate change is occurring tended to agree that 
public action on GHG reduction is appropriate, and those farmers who attri-
bute climate change to human activity agree more strongly. These results 
support H4. Furthermore, the results suggest that trust in agricultural and 
environmentally oriented groups as sources of information about climate 
change have negative and positive indirect effects, respectively, on support 
for mitigation through climate change belief. The lack of significance for the 
path from perceived risk to mitigation suggests that risk perception does not 
mediate support for government action on GHGs.
Discussion
As concerns about the impacts of climate change on the long-term produc-
tivity of Iowa’s soil resource base (Cox et al., 2011), awareness of Iowa 
agriculture’s disproportionate contribution to the state’s GHG emissions 
(IDNR, 2012), and exhortations to adapt to changes in climate and reduce 
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GHG emissions (e.g., Hatfield et al., 2011; Lal et al., 2011) mount, it is 
increasingly important that effective strategies to assist the agricultural com-
munity be developed. Dunlap (2010) posed several related questions that are 
central to this complex issue:
 . . . will farmers . . . respond more to climate-change messages from universities 
and USDA, or to those from [other interest groups]? Will they interpret 
problematic weather as evidence of long-term climate change, and accept that 
they must learn to adapt, or dismiss it as a “bad year” produced by natural cycles? 
. . . how can the importance of responding to climate change be conveyed 
convincingly to farmers? (p. 24)
This study begins to answer these pressing questions, and our findings 
have practical implications that can inform efforts to improve adaptation and 
mitigation efforts in Iowa and across the Corn Belt. The findings that trust in 
agricultural and environmental actors is associated with farmers’ beliefs 
about climate change, and those variations in belief structure are related to 
risk perceptions and attitudes toward action point to potential pathways for 
such outreach. In particular, the divergence of results on farmer attitudes 
toward adaptation and mitigation actions indicate that different approaches to 
outreach strategies will be required for these related but distinct responses to 
climate change.
Trust in Key Actors and Climate Change Beliefs
Our findings on trust have important implications for outreach to farmers and 
the agricultural community. First, the results imply that Iowa farmers are het-
erogeneous in terms of whom they trust on climate change. Many farmers 
expressed trust in environmentally oriented organizations as sources of infor-
mation about climate change (Table 1), and those farmers were more likely to 
believe that climate change is happening and due to human action, that it 
poses risks to agriculture, and that action should be taken. In other words, 
such farmers are concerned and open to adaptive and mitigative action.
On the other hand, farmers who express higher levels of trust in agricultural 
interests are less likely to believe in climate change, much less anthropogenic 
causes. These results provide evidence that the “manufacturing of uncertainty” 
that has played a role in shaping the general public’s beliefs about climate 
change (Dunlap & McCright, 2010) may also be at work in agriculture. As 
noted above, key agricultural interests have denied a connection between cli-
mate change and human activity; this study’s findings suggest that so-called 
“denial machine” tactics (Dunlap, 2010; Stuart et al. 2012) may have an impact 
on how farmers think about climate change. This result points to challenges and 
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opportunities: If farmers trust farm groups and the agricultural press for infor-
mation on climate change, it is critical that the climate research and policy 
community engage more with these groups, especially the farm press. While 
this might be difficult given the reluctance of some actors to engage in discus-
sion of climate change and potential responses, because these groups may 
influence farmer beliefs and attitudes, working with them is imperative.
Adaptation Approaches
Our results show that Iowa farmers largely endorse adaptive action focused 
on preparing for more extreme weather events. However, attitudes toward 
adaptation action were associated with beliefs and perceived risks; farmers 
who believed that climate change is occurring and perceived threats specific 
to farming were significantly more likely to support action to protect land 
from future extreme weather. In other words, our findings suggest that it is 
when farmers believe in climate change and perceive it as a “problem” that 
their willingness to take action is activated. These results also point to poten-
tially important pathways for climate change outreach to farmers. Farming 
requires more constant adaptation to weather and other biophysical contex-
tual conditions than most occupations, thus farmers are by necessity profes-
sional problem solvers (Nowak, 2013). Strategies that appeal to farmers’ 
creative responses to the problem of extreme weather may be effective ave-
nues for outreach focused on adaptation.
The extreme weather events that have impacted Midwest agriculture (Cox 
et al., 2011) may be helping to move farmers and major agricultural actors 
toward a problematization of climate change. For example, a recent report 
from the 25×’25 Alliance Adaptation Workgroup, a collaboration among 
major agriculture, forestry, and environmental organizations, highlights the 
vulnerabilities that recent extreme events have exposed in dominant cropping 
systems and calls for major adaptation action in agriculture (25×’25 
Adaptation Initiative, 2013). This signals an increasing openness to action on 
climate change among major agricultural actors. Our results showing sub-
stantial farmer support for adaptation action, considered together with evi-
dence that mainstream agricultural organizations are beginning to address the 
need for climate adaptation, point to opportunities to engage farmers and 
those agricultural actors through the lens of adaptation.
Mitigation Approaches
The findings on mitigation, however, point to a much different dynamic and 
signal that support for mitigation and adaptation are activated in distinct 
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ways. Whereas support for adaptation seems to be related to the interplay 
between beliefs and perceived risks to agriculture, support for mitigation 
appears to be conditionally independent of perceived risks, and is associated 
primarily with belief that climate change is occurring (and due to human activ-
ity). Moreover, only one third of the farmers endorsed the item measuring sup-
port for government action on GHGs, and they were almost exclusively those 
who indicated that climate change is occurring and due to human activity. 
Consistent with our expectations and norm activation theory (Roser-Renouf & 
Nisbet, 2008; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999; Weber & Stern, 
2011), it appears that only those farmers who assign blame to humans see value 
in societal efforts to reduce GHGs.
Another important finding was the lack of a statistically significant rela-
tionship between perceived risks to agriculture (e.g., “potential impacts on 
my farm operation”) and support for mitigation. Given that the mitigation 
variable measured support for government action in a general sense (not spe-
cific to agriculture), and that the perceived risk items were specific to agricul-
ture, this result is perhaps not surprising. Whereas adaptive action such as 
investment in protective conservation practices can have immediate positive 
impacts at the individual farm level, perhaps neutralizing climate risk, the 
climate-related impacts of government action on GHGs are diffuse and long-
term. Future research might use measures of perceptions of more global, col-
lective risks in addition to local, individual risks to further test variations in 
scale associated with mitigation.
Our findings suggest that for a majority of farmers, outreach that focuses 
on mitigation will not likely resonate. Most Iowa farmers do not believe that 
human actions are responsible for climate change. Furthermore, farmer con-
cerns about potential (local) risks to agriculture were not associated with 
endorsement of government action on GHGs.
Conclusion
The consensus view among scientists is that to maintain long-term societal 
food security, we urgently need to reduce agriculture’s vulnerability to pre-
dicted changes in climate and reduce GHG emissions (e.g., Hatfield et al., 
2011; Lal et al., 2011). The results of this study show that Iowa farmers, in 
general, seem to be willing to adapt to changing climate conditions and view 
their responses as risk management strategies to maintain crop productivity. 
However, perceptions of mitigation activities by government are less straight-
forward. Farmers who believe that climate change is happening and primarily 
anthropogenic are more likely to favor government action on GHGs, yet they 
represent a small fraction of the farmers in our sample. Moreover, more than 
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half did not believe that climate change is occurring, were uncertain about its 
existence, or believed that it is primarily due to natural causes.
Our research suggests that farmers (and possibly the greater agricultural 
community) are more open to adaptation than mitigation. Farmers adapt for a 
living (OECD, 2012), and they pride themselves on their ability to solve 
problems (Nowak, 2013). Lobell, Baldos, and Thomas (2013, p. 1) offer a 
solution to addressing agriculture’s contribution to GHG emissions in their 
findings that “broad-based efforts to adapt agriculture to climate change have 
mitigation co-benefits” and note that adaptation is often considerably less 
expensive than actions whose main purpose is mitigation. Many of the prac-
tices that reduce vulnerability of cropping systems most effectively—
reductions in tillage, planting of a cover crop to hold soil during fallow 
periods, managing fertilizers more efficiently—can also have significant 
GHG-reducing properties (Lal et al., 2011). By using outreach strategies that 
focus on adaptive practices that reduce risks and GHG emissions, the dual 
goals of adaptation and mitigation could be pursued while engaging the 
majority of farmers who do not believe in anthropogenic climate change.
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